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The purpose of this study is to assess the degree of employment discrimination against young 
people in the Ile-de-France region according to their place of residence by considering several 
spatial scales in order to measure the effect of the reputation of the administrative department 
or county (specifically Paris and Seine-Saint-Denis), the town or municipality, and of the 
local neighborhood.  The evaluation is carried out using experimental testing-type data that 
we developed following a protocol that allows us to examine the specific effects associated 
with each of these three spatial scales on access to employment, as well as their combined 
effects.  We are interested in discrimination regarding two specific occupations within the 
restaurant/catering industry, namely waiters and cooks, and we consider the impact of two 
levels of qualification.  For each of these profiles, we constructed six fictional candidacies 
consisting of young men who were similar with the exception of the testing feature which 
differentiates them, namely their place of residence.  Between October 2011 and February 
2012, we studied 2,988 candidacies that were submitted in response to 498 job offers posted 
in the Ile-de-France region.  This study consists of a statistical and econometric analysis of the 
responses that we obtained to these applications.  
 
*CAP: Certificat d’Aptitude Professionnelle (or Occupational Certificate) 
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1. Introduction 
The place where you live can have a decisive influence on the chances of obtaining  a job 
for several reasons.  First, the physical distance between the place of residence and the 
available jobs complicates the job search process and decreases the chances of leaving 
unemployment according to the so-called ‘Spatial mismatch’ effect (for a review of the 
literature on this subject, see Gobillon et alii, 2007, or Hellerstein and Neumark, 2011).  
Second, the socio-demographic composition of the geographical area affects the chances of 
accessing employment through neighborhood, peer, or social media effects, all three of which 
play a major role in the search for employment (see Galster, 2010).  Furthermore, the 
presence of local amenities, and notably the endowment of public sector employment, and 
subsidised employment influence the employment and unemployment dynamics of the 
localities.  Finally, employers can have particular preferences for workers from a certain 
locality regardless of the commuting time between the place of residence and the workplace.  
In  this particular paper, we seek to discern discriminatory employment behaviour tied to the 
place of residence according to the third mechanism.    
Measuring discrimination in hiring is based on the method of testing. This method 
allows one to compare, all other things being equal, the access rates to employment 
opportunities of fictional candidates that are similar by design in all respects except for the 
characteristic whose impact is the focus of the test.  A test of access to job interviews 
(« Correspondence Testing ») allows one to measure an effect specific to the place of 
residence independently from the impact of skill mismatches of the residents or from the 
physical distance to the job, i.e. other channels which are frequently advanced in the literature 
pertaining to a localisation effect.  It consists of drafting and sending two fictional yet realistic 
curriculum vitaes which are similar in all respects except for the non-productive characteristic 
whose influence on the hiring process we seek to assess: in this case the place of residence.  
Both job applications are sent simultaneously in response to the same job offers. The testing 
method allows one to control for the effects of other determinants of the access to job 
interviews because the candidates are completely fictional, and the job applications are sent 
by the researchers themselves.  For these reasons any observed differences in the responses on 
the part of firms cannot be attributed to a selection bias, unobserved heterogeneity, network 
effects, or different levels of search motivation.  Furthermore, the characteristics of the job 
offers and the skills needed to complete the tasks, as well as the type of enterprise, are 
observable. This type of experimental approach has already been successfully implemented in 
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order to measure the interacted effects of the place of residence and the ethnic origin on the 
chances of being called for an interview in the United-States by Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2004). In France, an early paper authored by Duguet et alii (2010) showed the statistically 
significant effect of the place of residence independently of the ethnic origin for the 
accounting profession.  Petit et alii (2013) confirm that same effect for the waiters, while 
L’Horty et alii (2012) find a stronger effect of the locality of residence for computer scientists 
who are women of French origin.   
In all these papers dealing with employment discrimination based on the place of residence, 
and more generally in the literature on neighbourhood effects, the definition of the boundaries 
and scope of the neighborhood are rarely questioned. Similarly, when the effects of the 
location are mentioned, the size of the region is rarely specified.  This is not to say that the 
notion of region such as the neighbourhood necessarily corresponds to a specific and precisely 
determined geographical area.  Nonetheless, the measure of a neighbourhood effect may vary  
a priori according to the boundaries of the region, and therefore it is interesting to consider 
incorporating larger or smaller scales into the analysis.  It is also important to investigate 
whether the effect of the neighborhood can be sensitive to its urban environment. Does living 
in a disadvantaged neighbourhood, which is typically labelled as a geographical priority area 
of the city (in the French context), have the same effects if that area is located in a more 
advantaged locality or a less advantaged one?  
This study’s novelty lies in the experimental measure of neighbourhood effects derived from a 
multi-level protocol that allows one to decompose the effects specific to the department, to the 
locality, and to the address of the subject. This protocol was applied to the Ile-de-France 
region in order to compare some neighbourhoods in Paris to some addresses from Seine-
Saint-Denis which are located in favoured as well as less favoured areas.    
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the results of several previous works 
done in France using similar methods.  The third section of the paper describes the protocol 
that was used to build the database, while the fourth and the fifth sections present the results 
and describe the econometric methods.  Finally, the last section discusses the implications of 
these results for public policy recommendations. 
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2.    Data Collection Protocol 
If one seeks to evaluate employment discrimination related to the place of residence, there 
needs to be a comparison of the access to employment of individuals who are similar in all 
respects except for the location of their residence.  By taking account of all other explanatory 
factors of the individual’s situation on the labour market, we ensure that it can only be linked 
to their place of residence.  This involves comparing the chances of hiring of two candidates 
for which the only difference between them is their place of residence.  These candidates must 
therefore share all the individual characteristics (sex, origin, age, marital status, mobility, 
extra-professional activities), the same human capital (degrees, experience, technical and 
language skills), exert the same job search efforts, display the same level of motivation, apply 
to the same type of vacancies for the same positions at the same time. At this early stage of 
the recruitment process, involving only applications and callbacks, we are holding the level of 
motivation and the level of job search fixed.  
These difficulties that are particular to assessing the degree of discrimination are overcome, 
all other things being equal, by using a methodology consisting of a controlled experiment 
called testing.  In principle, it consists of drafting from scratch two fictitious résumés which 
are perfectly similar in terms of qualifications and career paths. The only significant point of 
distinction that is apparent in these two applications is the one whose impact on access to 
employment we seek to assess (for example, the place of residence).  Both resumes are sent 
simultaneously in response to the same job offers at the same companies.  Since both 
applications are perfectly similar with the exception of one feature, any significant gap in 
access to interviews between these two fictitious candidates cannot be attributed to anything 
else but the isolated effect of this feature.  Our measure of access to employment is the 
discrete and observable event of whether or not the applicant received a call-back for an 
interview.   
The data employed in this study were constructed using the method of testing and were 
derived from an experimental protocol. The experiment consisted of sending over 3,000 
applications drafted from scratch in response to a sample of job offers that were posted 
between October 2011 and February 2012.  In this section, we present in detail how the data 
were collected. 
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Six Locations 
Six young candidates’ very similar resumes were drafted from scratch.  They differ only in 
their place of residence, which appears explicitly in their application. The places of residence 
of the six fictitious candidates are selected in order to measure three distinct effects on the 
access to employment, all other things being equal: the effect of the reputation of the 
administrative department of residence (similar to a county), of the locality (or municipality) 
within that same department, and of the neighbourhood within that locality (Figure 1).  We 
first chose two departments that were geographically close to each other yet quite 
differentiated in terms of the average standards of living of their residents, Paris and the 
department of Seine-Saint-Denis.  Within each department, we chose three addresses in 
neighbourhoods or localities having very distinct reputations but situated close to each other.  
The geographical proximity of these locations facilitates the measurement of the 
neighbourhood effects given the travelling distance to work. 
Figure 1 
The Measured Effects 
 
F-75 : candidates from the favoured neighbourhood in the 18th district of Paris  
I-75 : candidates from the intermediate neighbourhood in the 18th district of Paris 
D-75 : candidates from the Goutte d'or neighbourhood (classified ZUS*) 
F-93 : candidates from the town of Le Raincy in Seine-Saint-Denis  
I-93 : candidates from the town of Bondy in Seine-Saint-Denis, intermediate neighbourhood 
D-93: candidates from the city of Bondy in Seine-Saint-Denis, disadvantaged  neighbourhood 
(classified ZUS) 
 
*ZUS: Zone Urbaine Sensible= Sensitive Urban Area 
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The first set of three fictitious candidates resides in Paris in the 18th district.  They are 
distinguished by the reputation of their neighbourhood, which is identified by the street on 
which they reside.  One of the candidates resides in an area which is considered to be 
advantaged (Place du Tertre). Another lives in a disadvantaged neighbourhood known and 
classified as a sensitive urban area (Boulevard Barbès, ZUS Goutte d'Or).  The third candidate 
is located in an intermediate area (Championnet Street).  The second set of three fictional 
candidates resides in the department of Seine-Saint-Denis.  Two of them live in the town of 
Bondy; one of them in a neighbourhood that is classified as an urban sensitive zone` (Building 
Pavilion Bleriot Avenue, ZUS of the Blanqui neighborhood), and the other one in a less 
disadvantaged area (Violettes alley). The third candidate lives in the neighbouring town of Le 
Raincy (Augusta Alley), which is reputed to be a favoured area without any neighbourhoods 
which are classified as sensitive urban areas (ZUS).  The places of residence of the six 
fictitious candidates are summarized in Table 2, and their locations are shown on Map 1. 
 
Table 2 
Places of residence of the 6 fictitious candidates  
 
Reputation of the place of 
residence 
18ème district of Paris (postal code 
75018) 
Seine-Saint-Denis (department 
number 93) 
Disadvantaged (in ZUS) 
Candidate D-75 
Barbès Boulevard 75018 Paris 
(Zus Goutte d'Or) 
Candidate D-93 
Pavillon Building 
Blériot avenue 93140 Bondy 
(Zus Quartier Blanqui) 
Intermediate 
Candidate I-75 
Championnet street 75018 Paris 
Candidate I-93 
Des Violettes Alley 93140 Bondy 
Advantaged 
Candidate F-75 
Place du Tertre 75018 Paris 
Candidate F-93 
Augusta Alley 93340 Le Raincy  
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Map 1. Location of the advantaged and disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
Goutte d’or Bondy, Zus BlanquiPlace du Tertre Le Raincy
Rue Championnet Bondy, 
allée 
des violettes
 
Notes: The areas circled in red are the sensitive (disadvantaged) urban areas, in black are the neutral (intermediate) neighbourhoods, and 
in blue are the privileged (advantaged) neighbourhoods. 
*arrondissement=district, Rue=street, Allée =alley 
 
Source: General Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee on Cities - City GIS 
 
These choices of location are justified by the statistics presented in Table 3. The socio-
economic indicators for the 18th district are slightly below the average of the indicators for the 
other districts in Paris.  In particular, the median income and the percentage of households 
that have taxable income are lower than in other districts, and the proportion of the population 
living in ZUS areas is slightly higher than in other districts (1.5% compared to 0.3% over all 
the districts of Paris).  That district is in fact very heterogeneous; all three types of 
neighbourhoods coexist, from the advantaged to the intermediate to the disadvantaged (ZUS 
classified) ones.  Turning to the Seine-Saint-Denis department, the exit rate from 
unemployment to employment is close to the average rate prevailing in all of Paris.  However, 
in that department comprised of suburbs, people often do not have secondary-school 
diplomas. The proportion of residents of this department living in ZUS areas is much higher 
than it is in Paris, and the median income level as well as the proportion of households having 
taxable income are lower as well.  Those average characteristics of Seine-Saint-Denis, 
however, hide some disparities between and within communities.  Some communities are 
particularly disadvantaged, while others have very favourable socio-economic indicators.  
This is particularly the case of the town of Raincy, whose indicators are generally more 
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favourable than those for Paris, and especially more favourable than those of the 18th district.  
The exit rates from unemployment to employment and the proportion of households having 
positive taxable income are higher in Raincy than in the 18th district of Paris; in a similar vein, 
the unemployment rate and the proportion of people without a high school diploma are 
substantially lower.  Moreover, unlike the 18th district of Paris, Le Raincy contains no 
Sensitive Urban Zone (ZUS). That is not the case for Bondy, however, which is characterised 
by much less favourable indicators. The exit rates from unemployment to employment and the 
unemployment rate are close to those of the 18th district of Paris, but a third of the population 
lives in ZUS areas, and the median income and the share of households with taxable income 
are below the averages of the department and of Paris.  A third of the inhabitants of Bondy 
live in ZUS areas, while on average in Seine-Saint-Denis, this proportion is lower than one 
quarter.  
Table 3 
Statistics relative to the place of residence of the fictitious candidates 
 Paris Seine-Saint-Denis 
  
Average of the 
20 districts 18th district 
Average of 
departments 
Le Raincy Bondy 
Gross exit rates from unemployment  (return to work) in 2006* 34,24 28,71 34,65 40,12 35,03 
Net exit rates from unemployment  (return to work) in 2006* 33,22 29,31 33,38 38,30 32,62 
Share of individuals without a HS degree in 1999** 10,84 16,35 20,20 08,48 21,12 
Unemployment rate in 1999** 11,37 16,90 16,37 09,01 17,06 
Share of the population of the municipality in ZUS** 0,29 1,56 17,86 0 33,15 
Median household income by unit of consumption in euros in 
2006** 
25591 16079 15330 25151 13200 
Share of households with taxable income in 2006** 73,33 66,2 64,80 78,9 60 
Sources: * SOLSTICE Estimates from Pôle Emploi’s Statistics History File. Census ** INSEE. 
    Notes: "Gross rate of exit from unemployment" corresponds to the exit rate from unemployment from the locality, where the transition is the return 
to employment. The "net rates of exit from unemployment" are, in turn, derived by calculating the rate of exit from unemployment that the locality 
would have if the job seekers had the same composition as those in Ile-de-France.  
 
  The access-to-interview rates of the 6 candidates were compared on a pair-wise basis 
for the purposes of isolating several effects, which are summarized in Table 4.  It is important 
to note that these effects are interpreted holding all other factors constant, and in particular 
holding the distance to work fixed.  First we evaluate an effect of the reputation of the 
department of residence associated with a given type of area  by comparing the chances of 
success of a candidate who resides in the 18th district of Paris versus one who resides in 
Seine-Saint-Denis. This comparison is performed for three pairs of candidates: a) those who 
live in a poor neighbourhood classified as ZUS from the 18th district of Paris versus those 
from Bondy, b) those who live an intermediate area of the 18th district of Paris versus those 
from Bondy, and c) those who reside in a favoured area of the 18th arrondissement of Paris 
 9 
versus those from Raincy.  This departmental effect is therefore conditional on the reputation 
of the neighbourhood or of the municipality of residence.  Second, we estimate the effect of 
the reputation of the place of residence within a given department.  To achieve this we 
compare the chances of a candidate receiving a callback living within Seine-Saint-Denis in 
the town of Raincy (considered to be advantaged) to one living within Seine-Saint-Denis in 
the town of Bondy (considered to be less advantaged).  Finally, we evaluate an effect of the 
reputation of the neighborhood of residence within a given locality by comparing the chances 
of success of a candidate living in an intermediate neighbourhood with the chances of one 
living in a disadvantaged neighbourhood of the 18th district of Paris, or the chances of a 
candidate living in an intermediate neighbourhood with those of one living in a disadvantaged 
neighbourhood Bondy, Seine-Saint-Denis. 
Tableau 4 
The Measured Effects 
Pairwise comparison of candidates  Measured effects 
 
 
 
Candidate D-75 versus Candidate D-93 
Candidate I-75 versus Candidate I-93 
Candidate F-75 versus Candidate F-93 
Effect of the reputation of the department 
Are the chances of success of a candidate living in the 18th district of Paris or in 
Seine-Saint-Denis different when the candidate lives in … 
A disadvantaged neighbourhood (classified ZUS)? 
An intermediate neighbourhood? 
An advantaged neighbourhood? 
Candidate F-93 versus Candidate I-93 
Effect of the reputation of the locality or town 
Are the chances of success of a candidate living in Seine-Saint-Denis different if 
he lives in Raincy or in Bondy?  
 
 
 
Candidate I-75 versus Candidate D-75 
Candidate I-93 versus Candidate D-93 
Effect of the reputation of the neighbourhood 
Are the chances of success of a candidate different when the candidate lives in 
an intermediate neighborhood versus a ZUS… 
in the 18th district of Paris ? 
in Bondy, Seine-Saint-Denis ? 
 
Choice of two occupations working in  tight labour markets: waiters and cooks in restaurants 
The methodology of testing is particularly costly to implement, and thus it is beyond the 
scope of our paper to examine all the occupations comprehensively.  We elected to select 
certain occupations within the same industry for which there is a high degree of market 
activity, i.e. effective supply as well as effective demand.  Indicators for the degree of labour 
market tightness within this “employment Pole” were used to select the occupations that were 
included in our testing procedure.  We chose occupations for which the number of 
unemployed workers and the number of job offers in Ile-de-France were substantial.  By 
selecting an occupation with a high number of job seekers, one limits the probability of 
detection of a suspicious job application when a large number of resumes are sent 
simultaneously.  By selecting an occupation characterized by tightness in the labour market, 
one limits the number of refusals from employers with or without discriminatory behaviour.  
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This methodological precaution proved to be particularly useful in the context of an economic 
recession.  Nevertheless, the somewhat high success rates of applicants in an occupation with 
a tight labour market have a counterpart in terms of discrimination: the call-back process 
becomes less selective, and it is therefore more difficult to observe discrimination in hiring 
under these conditions.  We elected to carry out our testing in a context that should lessen the 
degree of discrimination in hiring. 
 
Among all occupations with tight labour markets, we have chosen occupations in the 
restaurant industry because restaurants are spatially widely dispersed in Ile-de-France. As the 
location of our candidates is given in his/her application, it is believed that the dispersion in 
distances from homes to workplaces will be sufficient to evaluate the effect of residence 
regardless of transport time between residences and workplaces.  On this basis, two 
occupations were subjected to testing in the restaurant industry: cooks and waiters.1  These 
two occupations are characterized in particular by their exposure to customers, which may 
play a role in discrimination in hiring (Neumark et alii, 1996).  Statistics on this industry are 
provided in Appendix 1.  For each of these two occupations, two skill levels were examined: 
skilled jobs requiring a degree of level IV (the French BAC-PRO, an high school diploma 
specialised in a profession) and less-skilled jobs requiring a degree of level V (the French 
CAP that is a vocational certification inferior to a high school diploma). 
 
Similar fictitious candidates 
The applications that were sent in response to the same job offers are perfectly similar in 
terms of productive characteristics and individual characteristics other than the one from 
which the effect is subjected to testing, namely the place of residence.  In particular, these 
applications are similar with respect to educational background, career path, and job 
experience in both quantitative and qualitative terms.  These applications are also credible for 
the targeted occupations. They were vetted and validated by professionals with experience 
                                                 
1
 According to data drawn a Historic Data File of the French unemployment agency (“Pôle Emploi”), the 
"kitchen staff" occupations in Ile-de-France include both a large number of job applications (5,529 job 
applications a year from March 2009 to March 2010) and a significant number of job offers (13,164 during that 
same period).  The tightness rate for this occupation (the number of job offers recorded in one month of a year 
divided by the number of job applications a year) is high (0.62) relative to other professions or occupations.  
These same statistics for the occupation of waiters in restaurants are 5,622 job applications and 8,875 job offers 
respectively, for a tightness rate of 0.48.  For the purposes of comparison, the figures for masonry in Ile-de-
France over the same period are 4,075 job applications and 2,371 job offers for a tightness rate of 0.26 
 11 
working in the industry before being submitted: this expertise ensures that applications are 
similar, realistic, and relevant. 
 
The six fictitious candidates are French, and the sound of their first and last names does not 
suggest that they are first or second-generation immigrants.  They are all males, and their 
given names are among the most common in France.  Their given names indicate their gender 
and are the most common ones for their year of birth (1984 for the qualified candidates and 
1989 for the less qualified candidates).  The six qualified candidates are 27 years old, and the 
less-qualified ones are 22 years old. All candidates display on theirs job applications being 
single, without children, holding a driver’s license, and having a car.   
 
These six candidates followed the same training path: the less-qualified ones received a 
Professional Aptitude Certificate (CAP) in 2007, and the most-qualified ones hold a CAP and 
a professional high school diploma (BAC-PRO), validated in 2002 and in 2004 respectively.  
These qualifications have been obtained in the context of an apprenticeship (two years for a 
CAP only and four years for CAP followed by a professional high school diploma).  The 
qualifications of all candidates are listed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Qualifications of the fictitious candidates 
 
 Waiters Cooks 
Less qualified 
jobs 
6 candidates holding a ’’Restaurant’’ CAP 6 candidates holding a ’Kitchen’’ CAP 
Qualified jobs 6 candidates holding a ‘’Restaurant’’ CAP and a 
professional high school diploma specialised  in 
‘’Catering, specialized in service and 
commercialisation’’ 
6 candidates holding a ‘’Kitchen’’ CAP and a 
professional high school diploma specialised in 
‘Catering, specialized in Culinary Production’’ 
 
Since leaving the education and training system, the six most qualified candidates that are 
cooks or waiters have accumulated seven and a half years of experience in three different 
establishments.  It is mentioned in their job application that one of the restaurants where the 
candidate has worked was a gourmet type, and the other two were of the traditional type.  The 
six less-qualified candidates worked in three different restaurants, all of the traditional type, 
since getting their CAP four and a half years ago.  None of the candidates has reported a 
period of unemployment: they were all employed when they applied for the job.  In total, we 
have drafted 24 fictional applications (CV and cover letters of application): six duplicate 
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profiles for two occupations (cooks and waiters) and for two levels of qualification (skilled 
and less skilled). 
 
Marginal differentiation and the permutations for job applications 
Since the applications were sent in response to the same job offers, they had to include some 
elements of differentiation.  These differences relate to the presentation of the resumes while 
remaining standard in format, i.e. the type of font, font size, layout of the page, etc.  The 
candidates’ experiences are from real companies which are different yet comparable (in terms 
of service line and size).  They all received their degree(s) and began their careers outside of 
Ile-de-France in different cities,2 but they have lived and worked in Ile-de-France for more 
than a year.  The candidates’ recreational activities and hobbies are also different - impersonal 
and without being excessively original or esoteric (sport, cinema, reading, music, etc...).  The 
brief cover letters accompanying the CVs were also formulated differently without being too 
unique.  A postal address, cellphone number and email address have been allocated to each 
candidate. 
To avoid having the style or content of a particular application systematically influencing the 
selection of companies for a particular candidate (and this risk despite the precautions taken 
during the drafting of the application), we have developed a system of random rotations 
between the CVs of the identities of the fictitious candidates.  The sources for the listings of 
job offers were alternated between the candidates throughout the job search process. 
 
Collection of job offers and field testing 
Websites from ‘Pôle d’Emploi’ and from ‘L’Hôtellerie-Restauration’ that centralize most of 
the employment opportunities in the catering sector were consulted daily in order to collect 
job offers. We sent applications to all offers that were relevant for the study that were 
available on the two websites, insofar as the employer allowed a contact by either regular post 
or by email.3  
All job offers for waiters or cooks requiring a CAP or a professional high school diploma in 
either fixed-term or permanent contracts and located in Ile-de-France fall within the scope of 
the study.  We tested all the offers that became known to us from mid-October 2011 to early 
February 2012.  A total of 498 job offers from separate establishments were subjected to 
                                                 
2
 The provincial cities where the candidates have completed their formation and started their careers are 
Compiègne, Orléans, Angers, Le Mans, Evreux and Chartres. 
3
 We have excluded the offers in which the employer required a telephone call or an on-site meeting. 
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testing: 253 job offers for cooks and 245 job offers for waiters.  This corresponds to sending 
2,988 applications (6 x 498). 
 
We modelled  the outcome of obtaining a job interview.  In the event of a success, however, 
no candidate was sent to an interview for the following two reasons related to methodology.  
First, physically sending candidates for interviews would introduce a bias due to the 
subjective judgment by recruiters of the appearance, behaviour, or personality of candidates.  
As this inevitable bias is unobservable to researchers and cannot be controlled for, it would 
generate a flawed measure of discrimination in hiring.  We believe that as long as  the 
organizing and arranging of interviews generates a cost to the recruiter, he/she will only 
convoke candidates who actually have a fair chance of obtaining the job.  We therefore 
assume that discriminatory behaviour on the part of employers occurs primarily during the 
selection of written applications of candidates who are granted an interview (for which the 
potentially discriminating factor is the residence explicitly appearing on the resume).  There 
are also no photographs of the candidates on their written applications.  Second, the process of 
data collection is simplified, so that for a given time period (of about four months in this 
case), we are able to generate a more substantial sample size (nearly 500 job offers were 
tested). 
 
Applications in response to the same job offer were usually sent on the day of release of the 
offer by e-mail from the mailbox of each candidate, or by the post.  In the latter case, 
applications were mailed from various post offices in Ile-de-France in order to reduce the risk 
of detecting patterns in our testing procedures. 
 
The response is considered to be positive when the recruiter invites the applicant to an 
interview, or if he/she conveys interest in obtaining more information on the present situation 
of the candidate or on his qualifications.  However, the response is considered negative if the 
recruiter formally refuses the application, or if there is no reply. 
 
3. Descriptive Statistics on Success Rates 
 
We first present descriptive statistics drawn from the data set that is generated from our 
testing experiment on the success rates of different profiles of candidates. These call-back 
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rates for invitations to a job interview give a general idea of the extent of discrimination, but it 
is important to confirm whether the differences observed are robust to the inclusion of several 
different characteristics of the job offers.  Indeed, while the characteristics contained in the 
resume sent in response to each offer are similar, except for the place of residence, the job 
offers are in turn very diverse in nature.  In the following section we take into account the 
characteristics of the offers.   
 
Success rates by place of residence of the candidate 
Overall, 38.5% of job offers that were subjected to testing led to a positive response for at 
least one of the six fictitious candidates.  The positive response rate is slightly higher for 
cooks (41.9%) than for waiters (35, 1%), reflecting a looser labour market in the case of the 
latter (Table 6).  This finding is consistent with what was reported in the survey data 
contained in The Labour Force Needs, conducted by ‘Pôle d’Emploi’, in which employers at 
hotels, cafes, and restaurants reported having greater difficulty recruiting cooks (45% in Paris 
and 59% in Seine-Saint-Denis) than waiters (38% in Paris, 25% in Seine-Saint-Denis) (see 
Table A2 of the Appendix).  The response rate is globally satisfactory, and even higher than 
that obtained in the testing investigations carried out by Duguet et alii (2010) and Petit et alii 
(2012). 
Table 6 
Distribution of the number of positive responses by job offer 
 All Cooks Waiters 
None 61.5% 58.1% 64.9% 
1 or more 38.5% 41.9% 35.1% 
1 and 2 16.1% 16.2% 15.9% 
3 and 4 10.2% 10.3% 10.2% 
5 and 6 12.2% 15.4% 9.0% 
 
A first indication of the results is presented in terms of gross success rates cross-tabulated for 
each type of candidate (Table 7).  We note that the pattern of gross rates of success according 
to the neighbourhood quality for cooks as well as for waiters, and for skilled occupations as 
well for the less-skilled occupations, are in line with our expectations.  We also note that 
success rates are lower for the least qualified profiles than for the most qualified ones, and 
they are generally higher for cooks than for waiters.   
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Table 7 
Gross rate of success on the same job offers  
 90% confidence interval 
 
Positive 
answers rate 
t-statistic 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Cooks     
Level CAP     
     Disadvantaged neighbourhood  19.3% 8.05 15.4% 23.3% 
     Intermediate neighbourhood 22.3% 8.85 18.2% 26.4% 
     Advantaged neighbourhood 23.7% 9.06 19.4% 28.0% 
Level BAC     
     Disadvantaged neighbourhood  25.4% 8.82 20.7% 30.1% 
     Intermediate neighbourhood 26.3% 9.11 21.6% 31.0% 
     Advantaged neighbourhood 26.2% 9.05 21.5% 31.0% 
Waiters     
Level CAP     
     Disadvantaged neighbourhood  13.7% 7.06 10.6% 16.9% 
     Intermediate neighbourhood 14.7% 7.30 11.4% 18.1% 
     Advantaged neighbourhood 16.0% 7.67 12.6% 19.4% 
Level BAC     
     Disadvantaged neighbourhood  20.2% 6.65 15.2% 25.1% 
     Intermediate neighbourhood 19.6% 6.61 14.8% 24.5% 
     Advantaged neighborhood 24.2% 7.53 18.9% 29.4% 
t-statistics and confidence intervals were calculated using the bootstrap method based on 10, 000 draws. 
 
This apparent hierarchy of success rates by neighbourhood of residence appears to be sharper 
in Paris than in Seine-Saint-Denis.  Note that the differentials in the success rate by place of 
residence are remarkable.  A favourable location doubles the chances of being invited to a job 
interview for waiters of CAP level, for which the success rate rises from 9.6% if they reside in 
an intermediate area of Seine-Saint-Denis to 19.9% if they reside in an intermediate area of 
Paris.  For skilled waiters, deviations in the success rates range up to 200 % between an 
intermediate neighborhood of Seine-Saint-Denis (10.2%) and an advantaged area of Paris 
(29.1%).  To proceed further, we must test whether these differences in success rates are 
significant. 
 
The purpose of Table 8 is to test the pair-wise differences in success rates in order to 
determine if they are significantly different from zero.  The first part of the table lists the 
estimates of the effects of the department (Paris compared to Seine-Saint Denis) conditional 
on the neighbourhood of residence, occupation, and level of training.  We discern the 
expected sign of the effect of the department for almost all of the profiles of candidates, and 
these estimates are statistically significant.  The effect is often of high magnitude, with 
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differences in success rates across departments being much higher than is the case for the 
other spatial scales.  It is noteworthy that the effect of the department is still much stronger 
than the effect of neighbourhood. 
 
The effect of the locality (or town) is shown in the section “Intermediate versus Advantaged 
Effect” corresponding to the Seine-Saint-Denis row.  We compare the effect of living in the 
town of Bondy rather than in Raincy. We actually found a significant effect but only for the 
most qualified waiters, for whom the difference in success rates is 6.76 percentage points. 
 
There is also an effect of the type of area (i.e. disadvantaged versus intermediate) conditional 
on the department, but it is less marked than the effect of the department conditioned on the 
neighbourhood.  This former effect is significant only for certain profiles and for certain 
neighbourhoods.  The effect of the disadvantaged neighbourhood versus the intermediate 
neighbourhood is significant at 10% level for less-skilled cooks in Seine-Saint-Denis and for 
the skilled waiters from Paris.  
 
The estimated effects are almost always more pronounced for waiters than for cooks.  One 
possible interpretation of this result is that the market for cooks is a bit tighter, which makes 
discriminatory behaviour more costly for employers.  Another interpretation is that the waiters 
are in face-to-face contact with customers, which can potentially constitute an additional 
source of discrimination.  A server has to master customer relations, which requires strong 
interpersonal communication skills.  Employers could display prejudice by believing that 
living in a poorer area could be associated with lower expressive and communication skills of 
candidates.  Discrimination related to the place of residence against waiters would be a case 
of statistical discrimination evoked by Arrow.  This interpretation is consistent with the 
results of an earlier study  derived from French data, which indicated that discrimination is 
more pronounced in France for professions and occupations that interact with the customers.  
This  would explain why foreigners face greater difficulties accessing employment in the 
large urban centers where these occupations are concentrated (Bouvard et al, 2008). 
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Table 8 
Differences in success rates on the same job offers 
pairwise comparisons on the same 
job offers 
Gap 
(in % points) t-statistic 
Gap 
(in % points) t-statistic 
Joint effect of the department and disadvantaged    
neighbourhood  (Disadvantaged Seine-Saint-Denis versus 
advantaged Paris)    
 Cooks  Waiters  
CAP -6.6* -1.95 -10.3*** -3.78 
BAC -7.8* -1.85 -14.7*** -2.62 
     
Effect of the department ( number 93  
versus number 75)     
 Cooks  Waiters  
CAP     
Disadvantaged neighbourhood -0.67 -0,20 -5.78** -2.20 
Intermediate neighbourhood -0.74 -0,28 -10.28*** -3.41 
Advantaged neighbourhood -3.69 -1,10 -10.33*** -3.56 
BAC     
Disadvantaged neighbourhood -4.29 -1,04 -6.83 -1.55 
Intermediate neighbourhood -12.99*** -3,29 -19.08*** -4.26 
Advantaged neighbourhood -9.53** -2,13 -14.59** -2.70 
     
Effect of neighbourhood, disadvantaged versus intermediate    
 Cooks  Waiters   
CAP     
Paris -2.90 -0.94 -3.16 -1.37 
Seine-Saint-Denis -2.92* -1.66 1.32 0.65 
BAC     
Paris -5.19 -1.52 -5.60* -1.70 
Seine-Saint-Denis 3.50 1.03 6.73* 1.93 
     
Effect of neighbourhood, disadvantaged versus advantaged    
 Cooks  Waiters  
CAP     
Paris -5.81* -1.89 -4.49** -2.13 
Seine-Saint-Denis -2.89 -1.15 0.01 0.01 
BAC     
Paris -3.47 -0.95 -7.98 -1.50 
Seine-Saint-Denis 1.75 0.51 0.00 0.00 
Effect of the locality (effect Bondy versus Raincy in Seine-Saint-Denis)   
 Cooks  Waiters  
CAP -0.01 0.00 -1.27 -0.71 
BAC -1.75 -0.49 -6.76* -1.95 
The t-statistics were calculated using the bootstrap method done over 10 000 draws.  
Notes : For example, to measure the effect of the disadvantaged neighbourhood compared to the advantaged 
neighbourhood, we subtract the success rate of the disadvantaged neighbourhood from the rate of the advantaged 
neighbourhood. The difference is negative, meaning that there is a preference for the advantaged neighbourhoods  
*** significant at the 1% level, ** at the  5% level,  and * at the 10% level  
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Table 9 
Binomial Test for the existence of Discrimination 
 
Pairwise comparisons on the 
same job offers 
 
1st 
favourite 
group (N1) 
2nd 
favourite 
group (N2) 
P1 = 
N1/(N1+N
2) 
Null Hypothesis : P1 = ½  
 
    Alternative 
P1 < 1/2 
Alternative  
P1 ≠ 1/2 
Alternative 
P1 > 1/2 
Joint effect of the department and disadvantaged neighbourhood  (Disadvantaged Seine-Saint-Denis 
versus advantaged Paris) 
Cooks       
CAP 6 15 0,286 0,039** 0,078* 0,987 
BAC 8 17 0,320 0,054* 0,108 0,978 
Waiters       
CAP 2 18 0,100 0,000*** 0,000*** 1,000 
BAC 7 20 0,259 0,010*** 0,010*** 0,997 
Effect of the department (Seine St Denis versus Paris)     
Cooks       
CAP       
Disadvantaged neighbourhood 11 10 0,524 0,500 1,000 0,668 
Intermediate neighbourhood 6 7 0,462 0,500 1,000 0,709 
Advantaged neighbourhood 8 13 0,381 0,192 0,383 0,905 
BAC       
Disadvantaged neighbourhood 9 14 0,391 0,202 0,405 0,895 
Intermediate neighbourhood 4 19 0,174 0,001*** 0,003** 0,999 
Advantaged neighbourhood 8 19 0,296 0,026** 0,052* 0,99 
Waiters       
CAP       
Disadvantaged neighbourhood 4 13 0,235 0,024* 0,049** 0,994 
Intermediate neighbourhood 4 20 0,167 0,000*** 0,002** 0,999 
Advantaged neighbourhood 3 19 0,136 0,000*** 0,001*** 0,999 
BAC       
Disadvantaged neighbourhood 5 11 0,313 0,105 0,210 0,962 
Intermediate neighbourhood 1 18 0,053 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,999 
Advantaged neighbourhood 6 19 0,240 0,007*** 0,015** 0,998 
Effect of neighbourhood disadvantaged versus advantaged     
Cooks       
CAP       
Paris 5 13 0,278 0,048** 0,096* 0,985 
Seine-Saint-Denis 4 8 0,333 0,193 0,388 0,927 
BAC       
Paris 7 11 0,389 0,240 0,481 0,881 
Seine-Saint-Denis 9 7 0,563 0,773 0,804 0,402 
Waiters       
CAP       
Paris 2 9 0,182 0,033** 0,065* 0,994 
Seine-Saint-Denis 4 4 0,500 0,637 1,000 0,637 
BAC       
Paris 8 15 0,348 0,105 0,210 0,953 
Seine-Saint-Denis 5 5 0,500 0,623 1,000 0,623 
The analysis is restricted to job offers for which the candidates from compared groups received different responses (1st accepted, second 
rejected, and vice versa).   This is the exact binomial test of equal treatment.  
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%,* at 10% 
Notes : A significant test statistic in the column ‘’Alternative P1 < ½ ‘ means that dept. number 93 was preferred,  a significant test statistic 
in the column ‘’Alternative P1 > ½ ‘ means that department number 75 was preferred. 
 
In order to conduct a more formal test for the existence of discrimination, we conduct a 
binomial test whose null hypothesis is that no group is preferred over another.  These results 
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are listed in Table 9.  We conclude that there exists discrimination on the departmental level 
for all profiles except for the least-skilled cooks and those who are more skilled but residing 
in a disadvantaged neighbourhood.  We conclude that there is a disadvantaged neighbourhood 
effect that is limited to unskilled workers in Paris, whether they are waiters or cooks. 
 
Effects of the location of restaurants 
This first set of results is interesting, but it seems useful to distinguish between the location of 
restaurants as opposed to solely the location of the candidates.  Table 10 shows the success 
rate depending on the location of the job offers, and we find that there are significant 
differences according to the place of origin of the offers.  In the same vein, Figure 1 shows 
synthetic levels of success rate and the differences by place of residence for both occupations 
at the unskilled level, taking into account the location of job offers.  We do see significant 
differences in the success rates between the different profiles of candidates according to 
whether the offers are located in Paris (left side) or outside of it (right side). 
 
Table 10 
Gross Rate of Success According to the place of residence and the place of the offer 
 
Rate of positive 
responses 
 
t-stat 90% confidence interval 
   Lower Bound Upper bound 
Cooks     
Residence Paris - workplace Paris 33,5% 12,82 29,2% 37,8% 
Residence Paris - workplace Seine-Saint-Denis 28,3% 4,79 18,6% 38,1% 
Residence Paris - workplace other than department of Paris 
Area 19,3% 9,38 15,9% 22,7% 
Residence Seine-Saint-Denis - workplace Paris 26,1% 10,75 22,1% 30,0% 
Residence Seine-Saint-Denis - workplace Seine-Saint-Denis 28,4% 4,79 18,7% 38,1% 
Residence Seine-Saint-Denis - workplace other than 
departement of Paris Area 15,7% 8,23 12,6% 18,9% 
Waiters      
Residence Paris - workplace Paris 22,2% 10,38 18,7% 25,7% 
Residence Paris - workplace Seine-Saint-Denis 11,9% 2,33 3,5% 20,2% 
Residence Paris - workplace other than department of Paris 
Area 24,1% 9,96 20,2% 28,1% 
Residence Seine-Saint-Denis - workplace Paris 10,1% 6,57 7,5% 12,6% 
Residence Seine-Saint-Denis - workplace Seine-Saint-Denis 16,7% 2,86 7,1% 26,2% 
Residence Seine-Saint-Denis - workplace other than 
department of Paris Area 13,6% 7,07 10,5% 16,8% 
t-statistics were calculated by the bootstrap method using 10 000 draws  
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
Source : data from testing procedure 
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Graph 1 
Gross Rate of success in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and gap between disadvantaged and 
non disadvantaged neighbourhoods for skilled workers 
 
 
 
4. Econometric Estimates 
In our experimental protocol, we do control for the characteristics of job seekers, but we do 
not control for the attributes of job offers made by companies.  It is therefore necessary to 
verify whether the results generated by the descriptive statistics depend on the specific 
characteristics of the job offers.  To determine, all other things being equal, the effects of the 
department and the type of neighborhood on the probability of obtaining a positive offer, it is 
possible to use a discrete choice, logistic model.  Our specification is: 
 
           (1) 
 
with pij being the probability that the application i to the offer j is accepted 
 
X: level of education, the position wanted (cook or server), characteristics of the job offer 
QD: being located in a disadvantaged neighborhood 
DEP: being located in the department of Seine-Saint-Denis. 
 
Model 1 of Table 11 shows the results obtained when we impose a restriction on the 
coefficients  to  to such that they are invariant with respect to job offers. The estimating 
 21 
sample contains all 2,988 observations for which an indicator is observed for each qualitative 
variable regarding both the candidates and the job offers. 
 
The results confirm a very marked effect of the department and a strong neighborhood effect, 
albeit of lower magnitude.  Table 12 presents the marginal effects4 that are obtained from 
these results.  The negative effect discerned for Seine-Saint-Denis is 9.3 points, and the effect 
of the disadvantaged neighborhood in Paris is 4.65 percentage points.  This effect for the 
department is expressed in absolute value terms and has a magnitude comparable to the 
positive effect of holding a professional high school diploma relative to a CAP.  The impact 
of living in Seine-Saint-Denis can also offset the advantage enjoyed by cooks relative to 
waiters, which is attributed to the difficulties in recruitment in this occupation.    
 
The interacted effect of the department and the neighborhood is of the opposite sign, which 
means that a disadvantaged neighborhood is less detrimental when one lives in a department 
that is already disadvantaged.  The penalty associated with hiring people from disadvantaged 
neighborhoods is higher in Paris than in Seine-Saint-Denis.   
 
Models 2 and 3 of Table 11 introduce a hierarchical structure (Bryk and Raudenbush (1992), 
Hox (2002)).  They allow one to take account of the structure of the data obtained with the 
testing procedure and to test the sensitivity of coefficients associated with the effects of the 
department and neighborhood to the characteristics of job offers.  The objective is to control 
for the observable effects and to adjust for the unobservable influences associated with job 
offers to which CVs were sent.  The form of the hierarchical model allows for parameters as 
follows: 
        (2) 
The parameter  is a linear combination of the average effect for each offer expressed by 
the coefficients , which is a fixed effect related to the characteristics of offers, and 
a random disturbance term . The variable d75 equals 1 if the job is located in Paris and 0 
otherwise, and the index k refers to the firm. 
Model 2 corresponds to the case where only   varies according to the offers. This model is 
identical to a logit model with random effects. The intra-class correlation is strong because 
                                                 
4
 The marginal effect associated with living in a disadvantaged neighborhood in Seine-Saint-Denis is formally 
obtained by calculating:  _ ) where _ is a vector of the means of the explanatory variables except for QD and 
DEP, and _.  This formula applies because all of our variables are discrete.   
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more than 80% of the total variance is explained by the hierarchical structure of the data.  
When taking into account this dimension of variation, the marginal effect associated with the 
department and the neighborhood fall considerably, but it remains large and statistically 
significant. 
Model 3 integrates three elements associated with the offers that may affect the coefficients of 
the department and the neighborhood.  Several tests were performed and only the coefficient 
 changes significantly depending on the location of the job offers. 
 
Table 11 
Estimates of the probability of having a positive response 
  
Model 1 
  
Model 2 
  
Model 3 
  
Localization of the offer Coef. std. Coef. std. Coef. std. 
Locality in Seine St Denis (Dep93) -0.595*** 0.114 -1.395*** 0.183 -1.608*** 0.445 
Locality in sensitive urban area 
(zus) -0.268** 0.134 -0.642*** 0.208 -0.749*** 0.227 
zus*dep93 0.312 0.200 0.742** 0.306 0.882** 0.344 
Characteristics of the individual             
Advanced certification  0.400*** 0.106 1.147** 0.491 1.531*** 0.541 
Offer for a cook (ref. waiter) 0.482*** 0.100 1.019** 0.450 1.340** 0.562 
Characteristics of the offer and 
the enterprise              
Entreprise located in Paris proper 
(d75) 0.490*** 0.104 1.005** 0.455 1.069** 0.517 
Offer found in Pôle Emploi 0.555*** 0.116 0.933* 0.519 0.980* 0.597 
Type of entreprise (ref : brewers 
pubs)             
Asian specialties -0.555* 0.321 -0.792 1.253 -0.953 1.457 
Crêperies -0.100 0.166 -0.031 0.696 0.078 0.800 
Gourmet type restaurants  0.236 0.396 0.380* 1.919 0.671 2.190 
Pizzerias and Italian restaurants  0.537*** 0.197 1.169 0.919 1.715* 1.059 
Traditional Restaurants  0.610** 0.282 1.395 1.326 2.124 1.519 
Hôtels restaurants 0.229 0.157 0.514 0.709 0.657 0.814 
Autres 0.613*** 0.178 1.503* 0.832 1.986** 0.958 
NSP 0.577*** 0.206 1.258 0.933 1.974* 1.070 
Constant -2.213*** 0,210 -4.966*** 0,832 -6.068*** 0.981 
sigma u0     3.699*** 0,287 4.304*** 0.345 
d75*Dep93         -0.996** 0.508 
Sigma u1         2.614*** 0.362 
intra-class correlation     80.6% % 67.5%   
Pseudo-R2 4.65%   4.86%   7.8%   
Log likelihood  -1445.8   -989.2   -958.5   
Akaike Information criterion  2929.7  2018.3  1961.0  
The estimated standard errors are calculated via bootstrapping based on 10,000 draws   
*** significatif au seuil de 1%, ** de 5%, * de 10% 
Source : data generated through testing 
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The following relation is obtained from model (3): 
 
 
 
 
The negative effect of the department is distributed normally with mean - 2.604 and variance  
2.612  for job offers located in Paris.  The average of this effect is only -1.608 for job offers 
located outside of Paris with the same underlying variance.  However, the job offers located in 
Paris have a conflicting effect for candidates located in Seine-Saint-Denis.  It generally leads 
to a higher rate of response relative to other places of origin for offers, but employers tend to 
discriminate more against candidates from that department. 
Table 12 
Determination of marginal effects associated with the department and the neighborhood  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Located in Seine St Denis -9,23*** -4,24*** -7,61*** 
Located in ZUS in Seine-St-Denis -8,83*** -4,09*** -7,51*** 
Located in ZUS in Paris -4,65*** -2,63*** -4,41*** 
Advanced certification  5,07*** 1,63*** 1,91*** 
*** significatif at the level of 1%, ** de 5%, * de 10% 
Source : data generated from testing 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have shown that the residence of a job applicant could have an effect on the chances of 
access to employment according to several spatial scales.  This effect of residence exists at the 
departmental level , and it is very strong in the case of Seine-Saint-Denis.  This effect also 
exists to a lesser extent at the level of the neighborhood of residence.  The two effects are 
cumulative while partially offsetting, and they are important in magnitude, since living at a 
``good address`` can triple the chances of being invited to a job interview. Living in a 
disadvantaged neighborhood is less of a handicap when the applicant lives in a disadvantaged 
department.   
These conclusions are based on a controlled experiment carried out in Ile-de-France, for 
fictional job candidates residing in Paris and in Seine-Saint-Denis, between October 2011 and 
February 2012 for the occupations of waiters and cooks. They are not necessarily applicable 
to other locations, other time periods, and other professions or occupations.  It would be 
necessary carry out new tests for the existence of discrimination in order to confirm their level 
of generality. Nevertheless, our findings confirm those from previous studies on other 
professions or occupations, which consistently concluded that there exists a marked effect of 
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residence (Duguet et al [2010], L'Horty et al [2012], Small et al [2013]).  Our findings 
dovetail with the point that the applicant`s place of residence sends a signal that may capture a 
combined effect of the department, the town or municipality, and the neighborhood.  It 
appears that unemployed workers have a strong incentive to change their place of residence, 
both the neighborhood but also the department.  This phenomenon has the potential to 
reinforce the spatial disparities in access to employment by promoting the spatial 
concentration of job seekers.   
The place of residence plays an active role in the individual determinants of return to work 
through the behavior of employers who select candidates based on their address.  Until 
recently the existence of discrimination in employment related to the place of residence, as 
opposed to discrimination based on gender or ethnic origin, was not discerned in France.  At 
the present time, discrimination based on the place of residence is not among the criteria upon 
which discrimination is forbidden by law. (Article 225-1 of the Criminal Code). 
To explain the effect specific to the place of residence, we turn to sources of statistical 
discrimination, that is to say discrimination based not on preferences but rather on 
information available to the employer.  In the absence of perfect information about the 
productivity of job applicants, employers attribute to these individual candidates what they 
think are the average characteristics of populations represented particularly in these 
neighborhoods, i.e. French immigrants with vulnerable incomes and unstable employment 
situations.  Based on these perceptions, the place of residence could be perceived as a signal 
of lower professional reliability or of an undiversified social network. 
In a similar vein to the case of discrimination based on ethnic origin, which may affect 
immigrant inhabitants or their descendants, groups that are overrepresented in the ZUS - , it 
seems to us that the existence of discrimination due to place of residence justifies the 
implementation of remedial policies.  We think of features of urban policy that are targeted at 
disadvantaged neighborhoods, for which there might exist a new source of justification.  We 
think more broadly of all public policies that should take better account of the territorial 
criteria in their implementation, especially for social and employment policies.  We also think 
that discrimination based on place of residence should be legally recognized, and that it 
becomes a ground of discrimination that is prohibited by law. 
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Appendix 1 
Additionnal information on the restaurant industry in Ile-de-France 
 
 
Table A1 : Place of residence and of work for waiters and cooks in Paris and in  
Seine-Saint-Denis 
 Waiters  Cooks  
Hotels-Cafés-
Restaurants 
(HCR) 
Non HCR 
Residence 75 - work 75 67% 55% 62% 58% 
Residence 93 - work 93 9% 15% 11% 20% 
Residence 75 - work 93 1% 3% 2% 6% 
Residence 93 - work 75 23% 27% 25% 16% 
Total 53 292 37 476 90 768  
Source : DADS, 2009, Insee 
 
 
Table A2 : Difficulties in recruitment declared by firm managers in Paris and in  
Seine-Saint-Denis 
Occupation label  Paris Seine-Saint-Denis 
Aides, apprentices,  polyvalent kitchen employees  
 (including crepes,  pizzas,) 19% 17% 
Cooks 45% 59% 
Chief cooks 33% 51% 
Waiters in cafés, restaurants and  commissaries (cafeteria?) 38% 25% 
Hotel managers, innkeepers  50% 100% 
Hotel Employees  38% 26% 
Skilled hotel workers, team leaders  91% 0% 
Hotel and restaurant management,  including institutional dining  74% 19% 
Average Hotel-café-restaurants  33% 27% 
Total for department 35% 32% 
Source :  BMO survey, 2009, Pole emploi 
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Table A.3: Distribution of firms and employment in the HCR sector  
in Paris and in Seine-Saint-Denis 
 
 Number of establishments  
Number 
of workers  
Activity 
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traditional restaurant  7 715 1 134 8 849 66 590 5 191 71 781 
Fast food restaurant  2 662 827 3 489 20 070 4 863 24 933 
Institutional food under contract  280 105 385 2657 1 537 4 194 
Other types of restaurant  315 139 454 4260 1 396 5 656 
Hotels and lodging  1 909 264 2 173 32 263 2 772 35 035 
Tourist and other short term lodging  83 6 89 3 312 50 3 362 
Other types of lodging  113 28 141 1 725 338 2 063 
Beverage  685 163 848 3 669 468 4 137 
Cafeteria and self-service  23 7 30 376 211 587 
Catering services  195 57 252 2 451 481 2 932 
Source : DADS, 2009, Insee 
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